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JURISDICTIONAL ST ATEMENT
The Third District Court entered summary judgment for the Appellees on October
17, 2016. 1 Appellant timely filed her notice of appeal on November 15, 2016. 2 On January
5, 2017, Appellant filed a letter requesting that the Utah Supreme Court retainjurisdiction. 3
On February 7, 2017, this court issued an order electing to retain this case. 4 This court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-3-l 02(3)(j).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Issue: Did the Third District Court commit error in granting summary

judgment in favor of the defendants when the plaintiff presented the following evidence: Ms.
Cochegrus sustained injuries from an unsafe condition when she inadvertently tripped on a
rusted metal rod protruding from a hole in land owned, or maintained by defendants; the rod
was oxidized; the rod had several cuts created by lawn-mowing equipment; and the rod had
existed for up to six years prior to her injury?
a.

Standard of review: On appeal, the "analytical standard for review of

a summary judgment is the same as that of the trial court: [the Court] review[s] the facts and
inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the losing party. If [the Court]
conclude[ s] that a genuine issue of material fact exists, the summary judgment will be
overturned and the case remanded for further proceedings on that issue. Where no material

1

R. 672-67 4.

2

R. 677-679.

3

Retention Letter.

4

Order Retaining Case.
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~

facts remain unresolved, [the court must] examine the trial court's conclusions of law and
@

review them for correctness." 5 Utah courts have consistently held that summary judgment
should be granted in negligence cases only in the ''most clear instances."6 Summary judgment
may be granted "only when the matter is clear; and in case of doubt, the doubt should be
resolved in allowing the challenged party the opportunity of at least attempting to prove his
right to recover." 7 The purpose of "the summary judgment procedures provided for in [the]
rules is to furnish a method for searching out and facilitating the resolution of issues which
are not in dispute, and of settling the rights of the parties without the time, trouble and

<iJ

expense of a trial."8 As such, "summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should be granted
with reluctance." 9 Ordinarily, "[t]he plaintiffs should be granted the opportunity of producing
whatever evidence" they have prepared for trial. 10
b.

Preservation below. The issue was raised by evidence and argument

in the parties' memoranda as well as in oral arguments that were held at the Third District
~

Court's hearing on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 11

5

~

English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), affd, 848 P.2d 153
(Utah 1993) (internal citations omitted).
6

English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153, 160 (Utah 1993).

7

Durham v. Margetts, 571 P .2d I 332, 1334 (Utah I 977).

8

Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. United Res., Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 348-49, 471 P.2d
165, 167 ( 1970).
9

Housleyv. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124,127,427 P.2d 390,393 (1967).

10

/d.

"See R. 195-205; 487-493; 540-558; 642-651; 694-732.

2
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
Ms. Cochegrus does not contend that any statutes, rules, or other provisions are

iii

determinative of the issues on appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case & Course of the Proceedings Below

This is an appeal from the Third District Court's order granting summary judgment
in favor of Herriman City ("Herriman"), Rosecrest Village Homeowners Association, Inc.
("Rosecrest") and Future Community Services, Inc. dba FCS Community Management
("FCS"). The case involves personal injuries that appellant ("Ms. Cochegrus") sustained

®

when walking on property owned or maintained by Herriman, Rosecrest, and FCS.
Ms. Cochegrus filed her initial complaint on January 30, 2014. 12 The defendants filed
their respective answers and, after conducting discovery, Rosecrest, FCS, and Herriman filed
motions for summary judgment. 13 The Third District Court held oral arguments on the
summary judgment motions on September 21, 2016. 14 The Third District Court granted
summary judgment to all three defendants on October 17, 2016. 15 Ms. Cochegrus timely filed
for appeal. 16

12

R. 1-4.

13

R. 14-18; 76-80; 91-98; 195-205; 487-493.

14

R. 666.

15

R. 672-674.

16

R. 677-679.
3
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®

B.

Statement of Facts

Located southwest of the intersection of Juniper Crest Road and Mt. Ogden Peak in
Herriman, Utah, there is a grass strip between the sidewalk and Juniper Crest Road. 17
Herriman owns this grass strip, but claims that it does not maintain it. 18 Herriman does
maintain its lighting infrastructure. 19 FCS and Rosecrest maintain and remedy unsafe
conditions on the property. 20 Ten feet west of the corner of that strip, there was a hole that
was approximately six inches in diameter. 21 A shaft of rebar protruded two to four inches
from the center of that hole. 22
This rebar was installed as part of Herriman's permanent street lighting. 23 It was a
grounding rod for the street lighting system, and Herriman maintained it as part of the city's
infrastructure. 24 The subject property was inspected in October, 2006. 25 Sometime after 2006,
the rebar protruded from the ground and became jagged, with numerous nicks and dings. 26
Lawn mowing equipment impacted the rebar on several occasions. 27 Some cuts in the rebar

17

R. 64, 77, 92, 572-575.

18

R. 442, 10:2-23; R. 595, Request No. I. R. 618, 15: 17-16:8.

19

R. 489. R. 511, 31:7-14.

20

R. 548, 591-93.

21

R. 64,395,398,542,563-564,569,573-75,580.

221d.
23

R. 395-396, 7:22-8: 14. R.463-464.

24

R. 542-544, 587.

25

R. 594.

26

R. 543. R. 580, 11 :24-12:20.

27

R. 580, 12:2-4. R. 588, 22: 14-23 :6.
4
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looked fresher than others, 28 and the rebar was also oxidized. 29 Monte Johnson, director of
operations for Herriman, 30 admitted that this type of rebar was hazardous and should be
removed. 31
Ms. Cochegrus fell and sustained injuries when she impacted the hole. 32 In support
of their motion for summary judgment, Herriman, Rosecrest, and FCS alleged that they did
not know "about the hole and metal rod prior to the accident. " 33
Ms. Cochegrus presented evidence from several witnesses about the status of the sixinch hole and rusty rebar. She included this evidence in her memorandum in opposition to
summary judgment, and presented it to the court as follows:

I.

Candice Cochegrus

After she fell, Ms. Cochegrus watched the people mowing the lawn where she fell
"and noticed that they had either gone around [the rebar] or run over it several times." One
of the mowers she observed hit the rebar. 34 She fell in the area where the rusty rebar
protruded from the ground. 35 The rusty re bar appears in several photographs attached to her
deposition. Ms. Cochegrus appended these photographs from her deposition to her

28

R. 580, 12:5- I 5. R. 588, 24:6-17.

29

R. 588, 23:7-12.

30

R. 586, 4: 19-20.

31

R. 587, 15:24-16:6.

32

R. 545, 547, 568-569.

33

R. 196-197, 490.

34

R. 547, 568-569.

Js

Id.
5
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~

memorandum in opposition to summary judgment that she subsequently filed in the Third
~

District Court. 36 The photographs depict the park strip adjacent to the road and the rusty re bar
situated upright, just feet from the side of the road as it protrudes through the grass. It is
plainly visible. 37
She provided the following deposition testimony as an exhibit to her memorandum:
A. When the grass was freshly mowed, it was visible. And I know that when
they were mowing it, they had either gone around it or run over it several
times.
Q. How do you know that?
A.... as different people would mow the lawn, one gentleman went around it,
and I went and took photos showing the grass concealing it, and another
gentleman ran right over it.
Q. Did you see the gentleman run right over it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So the mower blade was high enough to go over it without hitting the rebar?
A. I believe it did hit it. 38
2.

Adam Jones

Adam Jones, a Herriman employee, with the title of Streetlight Tech 3, maintained the
street lighting, underground wiring and Herriman street lights. 39 He went to the scene to
remove the rod, and observed that the rod had cuts on it. 40 Some of the cuts were rusted. 41 A

36

R. 572-575.

37/d.
38

R. 569.

39

R.542-543, 578-579.

40

R. 548, 580.

41

R. 542, 578-580.

6
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couple of them were clean. 42 Mr. Jones said it was clear to him that somebody knew that
something was there because they were hitting it with the lawnmower. 43 The rod looked like
it had been hit multiple times. 44 Mr. Jones thought that the rod presented a hazard when he
saw it, and that it was a dangerous condition that should be removed. 45
He had no problem seeing it when he arrived on site to remove it. 46 Mr. Jones lives
in Rosecrest Village, the same subdivision as the plaintiff. 47 He has noticed that the same
people who mow the interior lawns ofRosecrest Village also mow the park strip where Ms.
Cochegrus fell. 48 In her opposition to summary judgment, Ms. Cochegrus attached and
summarized the following deposition testimony from Adam Jones:
Q.
A.

...did you have any problems seeing the rod in the park strip?
Not a problem .... 49

Q.

But it was clear to you that even after that ground rod was placed there,
that somebody knew that it was - knew that something was there,
because somebody was hitting it with their lawnmower; right?
Correct. 50

A.
Q.

Does it appear on the top to be more oxidized than it was when you
removed it?

42

R. 580.

43

R.581.

44

R. 580.

45

R. 542-543, 580-581.

46

R. 548. R. 583, 30: 15-25.

47

R. 548, 581.

48

R. 548, 581-582.

49

R. 583.

50

R. 581.
7
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A.

I would have to say yeah. Four years does a little bit. 51

Q.

... there appears to be cuts on [the rebar]. Did you have any idea about
what that would be? Or ...
I would go with a lawn mower.
Okay. Were those cuts rusted? Did they look like they were rusted? Or
did they look like they have been recent, and they're kind of clean?
If I remember correctly, there were a couple that were clean. And I'm
just trying to look at the pictures, but I can't really see. But I'm pretty
sure the top, they did look more fresh than what they are now.
Were some of them rusted, though?
Yes, it looked like it's been hit multiple times.
Did you thing that the rod presented a hazard when you saw it?
Yes.
A dangerous thing that should be removed?
Yes. 52

A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

3.

Mante Johnson

Monte Johnson, the director of operations for Herriman and the person in charge of
@

maintenance of the streets, parks, streetlights and other facilities, 53 agreed that a metal bar
sticking out of the ground somewhere from 1 to 3 inches presented a safety concern on a park
strip. 54 Had he become aware of such a condition, he would have remedied it. 55 Ms.

~

Cochegrus attached and summarized the following deposition testimony from Monte
Johnson:
~

Q.

A.
'"'

Would you agree with me that a metal bar sticking out of the ground
somewhere from 1 to 3 inches, depending upon the height of the grass,
presents a safety concern on a park strip?
Yes.

~

51/d.
52

R. 580.

53

R. 547-548, 586-587.

s4

Id.

55

Id.

8
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Q.

A.

And if you became aware of that, that would be something you'd want
to remedy?
Yes. 56
4.

Marcel Cochegrus

Marcel Coghegrus is married to the Candice Cochegrus. 57 He testified that the rebar
appeared rusted, and that it appeared to have been impacted by a lawnmower several times. 58
Ms. Cochegrus attached and summarized the following deposition testimony from Marcel
Cochegrus:
Q.

A.

Okay. And when you say it was in a hole, can you describe how big the
hole was?
Big enough for someone to trip on it. 59
5.

Maria del Carmen Tirado Sanchez

Ms. Cochegrus' mother-in-law, Maria del Carmen Tirado Sanchez, was walking to
church on the day of her fall. Maria saw Ms. Cochegrus trip on something in the grass and
land in the street. 60 When Maria looked over, she could see that Ms. Cochegrus hit a metal
rod in the grass. 61 Ms. Cochegrus attached and summarized the following testimony from
Maria del Carmen Tirado Sanchez:

56

R. 587.

57

R. 325.

58

R. 543, 561.

59

R. 348.

60

R. 547, 624.

61

Id.
9
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On April 29, 2012, we were walking to the church and I saw my daughter-inlaw Candice trip on something in the grass and land in the street. When I
looked over, I could see that she hit a metal rod in the grass. 62
6.

Ron Gordon and Kurt Tolman

City officials, Ron Gordon and Kurt Tolman, inspected the subject property when
Rosecrest Plat Q was turned over to the City. 63 They inspected the property in November
2005 and again in October 2006 when the final streetlight connections were completed. 64
7.

Defendant's Answers to Interrogarries

Herriman provided answers to Plaintiffs Interrogaties No. 4 and No. 6. Ms.
~

Cochegrus attached these to her memorandum in opposition to Defendants' motions for
summary judgment:
Kelby Electric installed the street lights, J-boxes, and grounding rod and
should have completely buried the grounding rod. The Rosecrest HOA and its
property maintenance crew (FCM) knew about the grounding rod protruding
from the ground or should have known about it and should have done
something to warn the public or remedy the alleged dangerous condition. 65
8.

Oral Argument

After providing this evidence to the court, counsel for Ms. Cochegrus presented
additional arguments supporting her position at a hearing in front of the Third District Court.
The parties engaged in the following exchanges:

62
63

Id.
R. 543, 594.

64/d.
65

R. 593.

10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mr. Church: "It is as the evidence shows a grounding rod that was put in there
as part of the street lighting installation when the development was done." 66
Mr. Church: "[W]e all admit that this was installed in 2006-2007 ... "

67

Mr. Church: "they'd have to provide notice as to the length of time this
existed, not supposition, not assumptions as to the length of time but to the
actual length of time." 68
Mr. Church: " ... witnesses said it looked rusted or oxidized. That also is not
evidence to the length of time that it was there. It's only evidence as to the fact
that it was rusted or oxidized. " 69
Mr. Parkinson: "And so we know that there is a rod sticking out of the
ground. " 70
Mr. Parkinson: "We know that the rod was placed there six years ago." 71
Mr. Parkinson: " ... this happened in April, so it's not the active lawn mowing
season ... we know that it's very likely from the prior season."72
The Court: " ... it seems like it's either a theory that it was negligently installed
in which case you'd have the [sic] show the manner it was installed or it's a
case of the installation altered over time, in which case we fall into this - you
have to show when the change occurred and when the city should have had
constructive notice." 73

66

R. 697.

67

R. 699 (emphasis added).

68

R. 698 (emphasis added).

69

R. 700.

70

R. 709.

71/d.
72

R. 712.

73

R. 719.
I1
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The Court: "And I recognize that it's a hard burden to put on Plaintiffs
sometimes when there's a dangerous condition that may have existed yesterday, it may have existed for years. " 74
The Court: "But what I'm really asked to do is to allow a jury to infer from
lawnmower marks that the condition had existed for a long time .. .! think first,
it's speculative to suggest that because there are lawnmower marks, there
would have necessarily been notice, even constructive notice ... 75
The Court: So, based on that, I don't think that there's a genuine question to
be presented to the jury in terms ofhow long the condition existed. And on that
basis, I'll grant both motions ... 76
The Order granting summary judgment stated the following:
The undisputed material facts fail to show that Defendants had notice of a
temporary condition of unsafe nature prior to the incident or an adequate
opportunity to remedy the condition assuming notice. Proof of such notice and
opportunity is Plaintiffs burden. 77

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in awarding summary judgment to Herriman, FCS, and
Rosecrest. There are genuine issues of material fact in evidence that preclude summary
judgment. The trial court failed to consider the facts and failed to draw reasonable
inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Cochegrus.
First, the facts presented in the summary judgment hearing show that Ms. Cochegrus
injured herself on a permanent unsafe condition. The hole and rebar existed for up to six
long years. The rusty rebar and six-inch hole are not temporary unsafe conditions-this is

74

R. 730 (emphasis added).

75

Id. (emphasis added).

76

R. 731 (emphasis added).

77

R. 6 72-6 73 (emphasis retracted).
12
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certainly not a case involving a puddle remedied by the mere swish of a grocery clerk's
mop. The law in Utah dictates that a party must remedy a permanent condition that it

creates orfor which it is responsible. Herriman, Rosecrest, and FCS undertook to maintain
the property located at the intersection of Juniper Crest Road and Mt. Ogden Peak. They are
liable because they failed to remove the rusty rebar and fill the six-inch hole. Ms. Cochegrus
collided with these dangerous obstacles and sustained injury. Evidence of actual or
constructive notice is unnecessary.
Second, assuming arguendo that rebar installed as part of Herriman's permanent
lighting infrastructure constitutes a temporary unsafe condition, defendants are still liable.
To prevail on a premises liability theory involving a temporary unsafe condition, Ms.
Cochegrus must show that Herriman, Rosecrest, and FCS had actual or constructive notice
of the unsafe condition.
Defendants had actual notice of the condition that injured Ms. Cochegrus. Ms.
Cochegrus, Mr. Cochegrus, Adam Jones, Monte Johnson, and Herriman officials all
provided testimony that, taken together-and with reasonable inferences drawn in favor of
plaintiff-establish liability: the rebar was implanted in a hole six inches across; the hole was
large enough for someone to fall and trip over; the rusty rebar and six-inch hole had likely
existed for years; 78 the re bar was readily apparent; lawn-mowing equipment had repeatedly
slashed the rebar; the rebar had sat in the hole long enough to rust and become oxidized; the
re bar stuck out of the ground several inches; and the defect was promptly identified after the

78

R. 730 (Even the trial court stated that the defect " ... may have existed for years.").
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accident. The defendants had sufficient time to remedy the condition before the accident.
They failed to do so.
Defendants also had constructive notice of the condition. Even if Herriman,
Rosecrest, and FCS feign ignorance of the rusty rebar and six-inch hole, knowledge is
imputed to them. Sufficient time elapsed for Herriman, Rosecrest, and FCS to discover and
repair the rusty rebar and six-inch hole.

ARGUMENT

I:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE IT FAILED TO DRAW REASONABLE
INFERENCES IN FAVOR OF MS. COCHEGRUS

This Court should overturn the trial court's summary judgment award. Specifically,
trial courts may not award summary judgment unless "there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." 79 Utah courts
have consistently held that summary judgment should be granted in negligence cases only
in the "most clear instances. " 80 And, it "should be granted with extreme caution where the
negligence of the property owner is alleged." 81
On appeal, the court has previously stated the following:
... [the] analytical standard for review of a summary judgment
is the same as that of the trial court: [the Court] review[s] the
facts and inferencesfrom those facts in the light mostfavorable
to the losing party. If [the Court] conclude[s] that a genuine
issue of material fact exists, the summary judgment will be
79

Utah R. Civ. P. 56.

80

English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153, 160 (Utah 1993).

81

Canfield v. A lbertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1226 (UT Ct. App. 1992).
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overturned and the case remanded for further proceedings on
that issue. 82
In making inferences, the court need not speculate: an "inference is a deduction as
to the existence of a fact which human experience teaches us can reasonably and logically
be drawn from proof of other facts. " 83
In this case, the trial court stated that the rusty rebar and six-inch hole "may have
existed - yesterday, it may have existed for years. " 84 The court was required to draw
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Ms. Cochegrus. That is, the latter was
true-the rebar and hole existed for years. Despite this, the trial court found that there was
no "genuine question to be presented to the jwy in terms of how long the condition
existed. " 85 These two statements are inconsistent.
The trial court heard evidence that the rusty rebar and six-inch hole may have existed
since 2006. Ms. Cochegrus, Maria del Tirado Sanchez, and Adam Jones all testified that the
rebar was readily apparent and visible. 86 Ms. Cochegrus and Adam Jones testified that the
lawnmower blades damaged the rusty rebar. 87

It was installed as part of the city's

82

English v. Klenke, 77 4 P .2d 1154, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), ajfd, 848 P .2d 153
(Utah 1993) (emphasis added).
83

Heslop v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 UT 5,122,390 P.3d 314,321 (quoting
Manchester v. Dugan, 247 A.2d 827, 829 (Me. 1968)); See also USA Power, LLC v.
PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20, 1 128-129, 3 72 P.3d 629, 64 7 (discussing inferences).
84

R. 730 (emphasis added).

85

R.73 I.

86

R. 543, 547, 548, 569, 624, 580-581.

87

R. 569, 580.
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G!t;

permanent lighting infrastructure. 88 Mu1tip1e pictures provided to the court indicate that it
protruded several inches out of the ground. 89 All of these facts suggest a "reasonable and
logical" inference based on ordinary "human experience": the six-inch hole and the rusty
re bar existed for a sufficient time that Herriman, FCS, and Rosecrest should have discovered
and remedied them. 90
The trial court failed to make reasonable and logical inferences as required by Rule
56 and the attendant case Jaw. This Court should overturn the trial court's decision to grant
summary judgment.

II:

NOTICE OF THE REBAR OR HOLE IS NOT REQUIRED IN
ESTABLISHING LIABILITY BECAUSE THEY WERE
PERMANENT CONDITIONS THAT CAUSED INJURY

Rebar installed as part of Herriman' s 1ighting infrastructure is a permanent unsafe
condition. Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets defines permanent unsafe conditions:
The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition of a
permanent nature, such as: in the structure of the building, or
of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or in the
manner of use, which was created or chosen by the defendant
(or his agents), or for which he is responsible. In such
circumstances, where the defendant either created the
condition, or is responsible for it, he is deemed to know of the
condition; and no further proof of notice is necessary. 91

88

R. 542-544, 587, 589.

89

R. 572-575.

Heslop, 2017 UT at ,r 22,390 P.3d at 321 (quoting Manchester v. Dugan, 247 A.2d
827, 829 (Me. 1968) ); See also USA Power, 2016 UT at ,r 40, 3 72 P .3d at 64 7.
90

91

Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah I996) (emphasis

added).
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Under the rule in Schnuphase, a permanent condition is a structure, equipment or a building.

It may also be the condition of a structure-such as rebar-that a property owner creates,
chooses, or for which he is responsible. 92
Herriman provided the following response to one of Ms. Cochegrus's interrogatories:
No. 6: Kelby Electric installed the street lights, J-boxes, and
grounding rod and should have completely buried the
grounding rod. The Rosecrest HOA and its property
maintenance crew (FCM) knew about the grounding rod
protruding from the ground or should have known about it and
should have done something to warn the public or remedy the
alleged dangerous condition. 93
Kelby Electric originally installed the rebar sometime between 2006 and 2007. 94 It was
inspected in October of 2006. 95 However, Herriman owned the planter strip where Ms.
Cochegrus sustained injuries. 96 The rebar was part of the city's street lighting system and
was maintained as part of the city's infrastructure. 97 Herriman was responsible for its planter
strip. 98 Rosecrest and FCS were also responsible for it because they had a statutory duty to

93

R. 593.

94

R. 593-594, 699.

95

R. 594.

96

R. 595, Request No. 1.

97

R. R. 542-44, 587, 589.

98

See e.g. Can_field v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(owner responsible for conditions that he created or took responsibility for); See also
Kerr v. City of Salt Lake, 2013 UT 75, 1 38, 322 P.3d 669, 679 (city has general
obligation to maintain sidewalk).
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maintain it. 99 Simply stated, this was no puddle or patch of ice. The rusty rebar is a
permanent condition and defendants should have fixed it. 100
The ground was inspected in October of2006. 101 Some cuts in the re bar, likely placed
there by a lawn mower, 102 were fresher than others. 103 The rebar was also oxidized. 104 The
evidence suggests that the rebar is a permanent condition. The lighting system of a city is
not temporary. It is the city's "equipment or machinery" and is a structure built to last.
Per the rule in Schnuphase, if a condition is permanent, then the defendant "is
deemed to know about the condition; and no further proof of notice is necessary." 105
Utah law has at least two cases that involve a "permanent unsafe condition" - Carlile
v. Wal-Mart 106 and Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc. ' 07 Carlile argued that Wal-Mart created a
"foreseeable, dangerous condition" through their use of electric carts. 108 The court reversed

99

Herriman Code 7-6-1.

100

'

'

0

R. 395-396, 7:22-8: 14. R. 542-544.

'R. 594.

02

R. 580, 12:2-4. R. 588, 22: 14-23 :6.

103

R. 580, 12:5-15. R. 588, 24:6-17.

104

R. 588, 23:7-12.

io

5

106

Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478.
2002 UT App 412, 1 16, 61 P.3d 287, 290.

107

\@

841 P.2d 1224, 1227-228 (Utah 1992) (Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d
476,479 (Utah 1996), refers to Can.field as a temporary condition case while Jex v. JRA, Inc.,
2008 UT 67, 1 13, 196 P.3d 576, 579, refers to it as a permanent condition case).
108

Carlile, 2002 UT at 11 14-15, 61 P.3d at 289-90.
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summary judgment and remanded Carlile's case to determine whether or not the use of
electrical carts presented a danger and whether or not Wal-Mart took reasonable precautions
for the safety of their customers. 109 The carts fell under the "permanent" condition
classification because Wal- Mart created their "manner of use."' 10

Canfield was also a "manner of use" case that stated the following:
there is no logical distinction between a situation in which the
storeowner directly creates the condition or defect, and where
the storeowner' s method of operation creates a situation where
it is reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third
parties will create a dangerous condition or defect. 111
In Canfield, Albertsons displayed lettuce through a "farmer's pack display" that
customers would visit. 112 The customers removed and discarded damaged or wilted lettuce
leaves from lettuce they intended to purchase. 1I3 Ms. Canfield slipped on these leaves and
sustained injuries. 114 The court determined that Albertsons did not need notice because "it
was reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties would create a dangerous
condition. " 115

109

"

0

/d. at ,r,r I 6-17, 290.

Id. at ,r,r 14-15, 289-90.

111

Canfield, 841 P .2d at 1226.

112

/d. at 1225.

11

~/d. at 1227-228.
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Interestingly, outside of the context of lettuce leaves and rogue electric carts, there
are few (if any) other cases that analyze permanent, unsafe conditions in Utah jurisprudence.

It is unclear what places a condition in the "permanent" category under the Schnuphase rule.
For example, many temporary unsafe conditions involve sidewalks, 116 asphalted
planter strips, 117 street lighting, 118 sprinkler systems, 119 pot holes in parking lots, 120 holes in
parking strips, 121 or railroad crossings. 122 These are hardly temporary structures. However,
Utah courts have treated them as temporary, unsafe conditions on the assumption that the
defects in these structures evolved over time; i.e. the defect was originally unintended. 123
The other temporary condition cases generally come from grocery stores, retail

116

Kerr v. City of Salt Lake, 2013 UT 75, 12, 322 P.3d 669, 672.

117

Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, 1 15, 67 P.3d 1017, I 022.

118

Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, a div. ofPacificorp, 969 P.2d 403, 403-04 (Utah

1998).
119

Porter v. Farmington City Corp., 2014 UT App 12, 1 6, 318 P .3d 1198, 1200.

120

Johnson v. Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App 76,113, 18,206 P.3d 302,304,307.

121

Kreyling v. St. George City, 2008 UT App 363, * I (memorandum decision).

122

Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern R. Co., 2004 UT 80, 114-6, I 04 P.3d 1185, 1189.

123

See e.g. Porter, 2014 UT App at
intended).

1 2,

318 P.3d atl 199 (broken water joint not
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establishments, or similar venues. 124 Ironically, none of these cases help the Court
understand the rule for permanent unsafe conditions as stated in Schnuphase.
The Court should take this opportunity to clarify when a permanent structure is a
temporary unsafe condition and when a permanent structure is a permanent unsafe
condition. Ms. Cochegrus emphasizes that a piece of rusty rebar installed as part of a city's
infrastructure is a permanent unsafe condition.
There are other issues with the temporary versus permanent dichotomy. Goebel v.
Salt Lake City Southern R. Co. vastly limits the "responsible for" language in Schnuphase

by stating that a party is not responsible for a condition if the party's responsibility is "only
in the context of maintenance, and not for its existence in the first place." 125 In Goebel, the
plaintiff argued that he was injured because of a gap in the field panels of a railroad
crossing. 126 The court required notice of the gap because Salt Lake City Southern Railroad
Company did not create the condition, and therefore was only responsible for
maintenance. 127 Matheson v. Marbec Investments, LLC dealt with a defective stair in an

I24

Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360, 361-62 (Utah 1973); Allen v.
Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 175-77 (Utah 1975); Ohlson v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 568 P.2d 753, 754-55 (Utah 1977); Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476,
4 77-80 (Utah 1996); Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 67, 11 1-7, 196 P .3d 576, 577-78; Price v.
Smith's Food and Drug Centers, Inc. 2011 UT App 66, 11 2-4, 17, 252 P .3d 365, 366-67,
369; Berrett v. Albertsons Inc., 2012 UT App 3 71, 112-3, 22-24, 293 P .3d 1108, 1110, 1114.
125

2004 UT 80, 120, 104 P.3d 1185, 1193.

126

1d. at 16, 1189.

127

/d. at 120, 1193.
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apartment complex. 128 This case might have fit wel 1within the rule for permanent conditions
because it was part of the "structure of a building, or of a stairway." However, the court
again stated that defendant was only responsible in terms of maintenance. 129

Goebel and Matheson have allowed the "temporary" rule to subsume the "permanent
condition" rule. The original rule acknowledged that if a party created a condition, notice
was not required. 130 However, the "responsible for" language from Schnuphase is now a
vestigial organ to the "permanent unsafe condition" rule. Basically, there is no such thing
as a "permanent unsafe condition" in Utah law; every permanent structure-even a rusty
re bar jutting out of the ground-is actually a temporary condition ala Goebel and its progeny
of cases.
The rebar in the hole in the ground that injured Ms. Cochegrus was a permanent
condition. Proving that defendants knew about the re bar and the hole is not necessary. This
Court should reverse the decision of the trial court to award summary judgment.

III:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE DEFENDANTS HAD KNOWLEDGE
OF THE RUSTY REBAR AND SIX-INCH HOLE

This court should overturn the trial court's summary judgment award. The trial court
entered judgment on the basis that Ms. Cochegrus failed to show "when the city should have
had constructive notice" of the rusty rebar and six-inch hole that injured Ms. Cochegrus. 131
128

2007 UT App 363, ,r 3, 173 P.3d 199, 20 I.

1d. at ,r 6,201.

129

13

°Canfield, 841 P.2d at 1226.

131

R. 719.
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In fact, Ms. Cochegrus did provide evidence that Herriman, FCS, and Rosecrest knew or
should have known about the unsafe condition. Notice can be established either through
actual or constructive notice. 132 Premises liability cases involving temporary unsafe
conditions must prove the following:
(A) that [Defendants] had knowledge of the condition, that is,
either actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the
condition had existed long enough that he should have
discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care [they] should
have remedied it. 133
The foilowing will establish that (A) defendants had actual knowledge of the unsafe
condition, or, in the alternative, that (B) they had constructive knowledge.

A.

Defendants had actual notice of the condition

Herriman, FCS, and Rosecrest had actual notice of the condition that injured Ms.
Cochegrus. "Actual knowledge is defined as 'direct and clear knowledge' or 'actual
awareness' of facts or information". 134 To prove liability under actual knowledge, a plaintiff
must show that the defendants knew about the condition and had time to remedy it. 135 This
is a high burden. Absent an outright admission by one of the defendants, Ms. Cochegrus
must demonstrate they had actual knowledge by other evidence.

132

Ohlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1977).

133

Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975) (emphasis

added).
134

Anderson v. Kriser, 2011 UT 66, fn. 15, 266 P.3d 819, 824 (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 950 (9th ed. 2009)).
135

Allen, 538 P. 2d at 176.
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In De Weese v. J.C. Penney Co., the Utah Supreme Court found that a unique design
in the terrazo of a department store routinely became "slippery" and dangerous "during
stormy weather." 136 In finding that the Defendant "knew ... that a dangerous condition
existed," the court reasoned "the terrazzo surfacing is part of the permanent structure of the
building." 137 It periodically became dangerous, and there was sufficient evidence that the
defendant knew of this danger because they purchased and occasionally placed abrasive
mats for the use of their customers. 138
In Kerr v. City of Salt Lake, a plaintiff was injured when he tripped on an uneven
sidewalk and shattered his kneecap. 139 The defendant argued that it did not receive sufficient
notice to remedy the condition. 140 However, the court held that evidence of a call to the city
eight days before the injury, along with evidence of how long it could take to remedy the
condition, was sufficient to survive a motion for directed verdict. 141 The Kerr court stated:
Kerr also presented evidence that Salt Lake City had sufficient actual notice
of the defect... [an] employee called the city eight days before the accident to
request that the sidewalk be repaired because laundry carts were catching on
the displacement. 142

136

De Weese v. J.C. Penney Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 121, 297 P .2d 898, 901 ( 1956).

139

2013 UT 75,

140

Id. at iJiJ 6, 32, 672, 678.

141

/d. at iJiJ 42-43, 680.

iJ 2, 322 P.3d 669, 672.

142/d.
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As in Kerr, the evidence shows that Herriman, Rosecrest, and FCS knew about the rusted
rebar and six-inch hole.
Proving actual knowledge does not require that Ms. Cochegrus force a confession
from Herriman, FCS, or Rosecrest. Many jurisdictions have held that "actual knowledge of
an unreasonably dangerous condition can be proven through circumstantial evidence." 143 In
other contexts, courts frequently rely on circumstantial evidence to prove actual knowledge
to sustain criminal convictions or uphold judgments in civil actions. 144 In Utah, many tort
cases proceed on the basis of circumstantial evidence only. 145
This case is brimming with evidence that the defendants knew about the rusty rebar

~

and the six-inch hole. It is more like Kerr and De Weese than Porter v. Farmington City

Corp. Porter is a case where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate constructive knowledge when
a cemetery sprinkler system created a sinkhole-but there was no other evidence of the sink

143

Pitts v. Winkler Cty., 351 S.W.3d 564, 574 (Tex. App. 2011); City of Irving v.
Seppy, 30 I S. W.3d 435,444 (Tex. App. 2009); City of Wylie v. Taylor, 362 S. W.3d 855, 861
(Tex. App. 2012); Ortega v. Kmart Corp., 26 Cal. 4th 1200, 1206, 36 P .3d 11, 15 (2001 );
Elston v. Circus Circus Mississippi, Inc., 908 So. 2d 771, 775 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005);
Caldwell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 229 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2000) (Circumstantial evidence
may be used to prove actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition); Fleming v.
Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 236 F.Supp. 306, 309 (W.D. Okla. 1964) (actual or constructive
knowledge "established by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence"); Hennessey v.
Hennessey, 145 Conn. 211,214, 140 A.2d 473,475 (1958).

~

144

See e.g. United States v. de Francisco Lopez, 939 F .2d 1405, 1408 ( I 0th Cir. 1991)
(constructive knowledge imputed to criminal defendant by circumstantial evidence); Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 114 S. Ct. I 970, 1981, 128 L. Ed. 2d 81 I (1994) (actual
knowledge imputed to defendant through circumstantial evidence).
145

Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr., 79 I P.2d 193, 197 (Utah 1990).
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hole's existence. 146 Plaintiff failed to prove his case in Porter because he speculated-with
t,j

little evidentiary support-that the defendant would have known about a sink hole had its
employees driven past it.
Here, the evidence suggests that defendants actually drove over the rusty rebar with
a lawnmower-probably many times over the course of six years. They not only drove over
the rusty rebar, but slashed it with lawnmower blades. The rebar had numerous cuts in it,
some fresher than others. 147 The rod was oxidized, 148 suggesting that it had been exposed to
the open air for an appreciable amount of time. Adam Jones and Monte Johnson testified that
the cuts were likely caused by a lawnmower. 149 The fact that some cuts were fresher than
others establishes that the defendant knew about the condition and had sufficient time to
remedy it.
The testimony of Ms. Cochegrus, though she made the following observations after
her injury, demonstrates that the defendant maintaining the grass strip knew about the
condition:
Q. Are you aware of any facts that would lead you to believe
that Herriman knew about this rebar or this hole in the grass
prior to your trip?
A. When the grass was freshly mowed, it was visible. And I
know that when they were mowing it, they had either gone
around it or run over it several times.
Q. How do you know that?
146

Porter v. Farmington City Co,p., 2014 UT App 12, iJ 12, 318 P.3d 1198, 1201.

147

R. 580, 12:2-15. R. 588, 22: 14-24: 17.

148

R. 588, 23:7-12.

149

R. 580, 12:2-15. R. 588, 22: 14-24: 17.
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A. After my injury I noticed because I would watch to see how
they would react to it. And as different people would mow the
lawn, one gentleman went around it, and I went and took photos
showing the grass concealing it, and another gentleman ran right
over it.
Q. Did you see the gentleman run right over it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So the mower blade was high enough to go over it without
hitting the rebar?
A. I believe it did hit it. 150
She also testified that she had seen people in the past walking around with clipboards,
taking notes on needed maintenance and repairs. 151
The evidence shows that the gentlemen mowing that grass strip were aware of the
rusty rebar. Their knowledge is imputed to FCS and Rosecrest directly, and Herriman by the
law of agency . 1s2 Because the defendants had actual knowledge of the rusty rebar and sixinch wide hole, summary judgment should be overturned and remanded.

B.

Defendants had constructive notice of the condition

The rusty rebar and six-inch hole existed a sufficient amount of time that FCS,
Rosecrest, and Herriman should have noticed and remedied it. Allen v. Federated Dairy
Farms, Inc. held that notice can be established through constructive knowledge. 1s3
"Constructive knowledge" is different than actual knowledge. Under a constructive

)SOR. 569, 98: I 0-99:6.
)SIR. 569, 99:11-21.
152

See e.g. Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 157 (Utah 1991 ). See also
Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins ofCal(fornia, 118 F.Supp.2d 1174, n. 6 (D. Utah 2000).
153

Allen, 538 P.2d at 176.
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knowledge theory, Ms. Cochegrus does not have to show that FCS, Rosecrest, or Herriman
actually knew about the rusty rebar and six-inch hole. Knowledge is imputed to them
"because the condition had existed long enough that [they] should have discovered it; and
(B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed ... [that they] should have remedied
it. ,,154
Utah courts must impute knowledge to the defendant "when there is some evidence
of the length of time" that the condition existed. 155 In Price v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers,

Inc. the Court of Appeals found that a puddle which had existed for "ten to twenty-two
minutes" was sufficient evidence as to the length of time. 156 For a puddle on a grocery store
floor, this was an "appreciable amount of time," and was sufficient to impute constructive
knowledge to the defendant. 157
In fact, since the court's 1956 decision in De Weese v. J.C. Penney Co., the law on
temporary, unsafe conditions is divided into cases where a sufficient period of time passed

154Id.
155

Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 67, 1 19, 196 P.3d 576, 581.

156

2011 UT App 66, ~ 17, 252 P.3d 365, 369.

1s1

Id.
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that a landowner had constructive knowledge, 158 and cases where an insufficient period of
time passed. 159
Of the cases cited, twelve involve some type of commercial, retail establishments,

usually grocery stores. 160 These cases establish a very clear rule. When an appreciable
amount of time has passed, an owner has constructive knowledge of the unsafe, temporary
condition. The law in the grocery store context is well-established.
This case does not involve a grocery store. It involves a rusty rebar on a planter strip.
While the rule in Allen and Price still applies in general terms, the court must tum to the
remaining body of case law to determine how much time must pass for a defendant to have

158

De Weese v. J.C. Penney Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 118, 297 P.2d 898, 899 (1956);
Ohlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1977); Kerr v. City of Salt Lake,
2013 UT 75, ~ 47,322 P.3d 669,681; Price v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 201 I UT
App 66, ,r 17, 252 P.3d 365, 369; Berrett v. Albertsons Inc., 2012 UT App 371, ,r 22, 293
P.3d 1108, I114;Rosev.ProvoCity,2003 UTApp77,~ 15,67P.3d 1017, 1022.
159

Kaer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 344, 431 P .2d 566, 570 ( 1967); Long v.
Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360,361 (Utah 1973); Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms,
Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 177 (Utah 1975); Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565P.2d1139, 1140
(Utah 1977); Matheson v. Marbec Investments, LLC, 2007 UT App 363, ~ 14, 173 P.3d 199,
204; Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476,478 (Utah I 996); Goebel v. Salt Lake
City S. R. Co., 2004 UT 80, ~ 22, 104 P .3d 1185, 1194; See also Fishbaugh v. Utah Power
& Light, a Div. ofPacificorp, 969 P.2d 403,407 (Utah 1998); Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 67,
~ 21, 196 P.3d 576,581; Porter v. Farmington City Cmp., 2014 UT App 12, ~ 12,318 P.3d
1198, 1201; Kreyling v. St. George City, 2008 UT App 363 (memorandum decision);
Johnson v. Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App 76, ~ 26, 206 P .3d 302, 309; Mingolello v. Megaplex
Theaters, 2017 UT App 4, ~ 2, 391 P .3d 361, 362.
160

See supra, fn. 158 & 159.
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constructive knowledge in this case. 161 In short, when a rusty rebar and a six-inch hole are
@

involved, how long is long enough?
In Kerr v. City ofSalt Lake, the plaintiff"produced evidence" that an unsafe sidewalk
"existed in approximately the same condition a year and a half before [the] accident." 162 The
court found that the defendant had constructive notice of the condition. 163
In Rose v. Provo City, someone installed an asphalted planter strip which was
subsequently used as a driveway into a restaurant. 164 Defectively designed, the driveway
caused an accident. 165 The plaintiff provided evidence that although the restaurant owner did
not create the asphalt driveway-and the city did not provide a permit for it-it had existed for
six years, from "1989 to the date of [the] accident in 1995." 166
In Rose and Kerr the unsafe condition in a sidewalk and planter strip existed for
somewhere between one-and-a half to six years before constructive notice applied. However,

See e.g. cases finding liability: Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, ~ 15, 67 P.3d
1017, 1022; Kerr v. City of Salt Lake, 2013 UT 75, ~ 47,322 P.3d 669,681; But See also
cases finding no liability: Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, a Div. ofPacificorp, 969 P.2d
403,407 (Utah 1998); Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R. Co., 2004 UT 80, ~ 22, 104 P.3d 1185,
1194; Matheson v. Marbec Investments, LLC, 2007 UT App 363, ~ 14, 173 P.3d 199, 204;
Kreyling v. St. George City, 2008 UT App 363 (memorandum decision); Johnson v. Gold's
Gym, 2009 UT App 76, ~ 26, 206 P .3d 302, 309; Porter v. Farmington City Corp., 2014 UT
App 12, ~ 12,318 P.3d 1198, 1201.
161

162

Kerr v. City ofSalt Lake, 2013 UT 75, ~ 41,322 P.3d 669,680.

163/d.
164

Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, ~ 3, 67 P.3d 1017, 1019.

165

/d. at~ 5, 1020.

Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, ~ 24, 67 P.3d 1017, 1024 (quoting
Pollari v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 25, 36, 176 P.2d 111, 117 ( 1947)).
166
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the rule is more nuanced-Ms. Cochegrus cannot merely tick off the years and claim that
defendants had constructive notice. Rose emphasized that time is not the only factor in

<i;>

finding constructive knowledge. 167 The obvious nature of the unsafe condition also plays a
role. Referencing a litany of older cases, Rose noted that other factors are relevant:
the nature and extent of the defect, its prominence in location
and otherfactors bearing on what could reasonably be expected
of a [defendant] charged with the duty of supervising miles of
streets and sidewalks. 168
In citing to Pollari v. Salt Lake City, Rose emphasized that it is not just the amount
of time that has elapsed but the "nature," "extent," and "prominence" of the defect that is
relevant. 169 Pollari is good law and it makes good sense. A party will have constructive
knowledge of large, obvious dangers in a shorter period of time. Small, hidden dangers
require longer. This principle is demonstrated in Kreyling v. St. George City, where a hole
"camouflaged by debris, leaves, and cobwebs" injured a person. 170 The camouflaged hole
was not prominent, obvious, or visible and constructive knowledge was not appropriate. 171

167

Id. at~ 23.

168

Id. (emphasis added).

169

Pollari v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 25, 36, 176 P.2d 111, 117 (1947).

17

°Kreyling v. St. George City, 2008 UT App 363, * I (memorandum decision).

171

/d. at *2.
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4u,

Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & light, a Div. ofPacificorp, and its progeny demonstrate
@

this principal. In Fishbaugh, a city did not have sufficient time to remedy a broken streetlight
when only four days or less had expired since the city learned of the condition. I72
In Goebel, a small gap in the "field panels" of a railroad track-merely inches
wide-caused a cyclist injuries. I73 Similar to the camouflaged hole in Kreyling, the Goebel
gap was small and unknown to the defendant. The court reasoned that while gaps in "field
panels" may evolve over time, there was no evidence that the gap existed for a sufficient time
for constructive notice to apply. I74 The trial court found that "no competent evidence that...a
dangerous gap existed prior to the accident or that ... a dangerous gap existed for a period of
time sufficient to allow [the defendant] to discover it and a sufficient amount of time ... to
remedy it." 175 This Court affirmed that decision. 176
Fina1Iy, in Porter v. Farmington City Corp., a plaintiff fell in a sink hole in a cemetery
and sustained injuries. 177 Like the Kreyling camouflaged hole and the Goebel gap, the Porter

172

Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, a Div. ofPacificorp, 969 P.2d 403,404 (Utah

1998).

Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R. Co., 2004 UT 80, iJ 22, I 04 P.3d 1185, 1194 (the gap
was wide enough for a narrow bicycle tire to get caught in).
173

174

/d. at iJ 25, 1194.

175

/d. at iJ 18, 1192.

176

/d. atiJiJ25,41, 1194, 1198.

177

2014 UT App 12, iJ 2, 318 P.3d 1198, 1 199.
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sink hole was "one foot wide and three feet deep ... it was covered by grass, and ... it 'could
not [have been] detected by reasonable visual inspection of the area. "' 178
The Goebel, Kreyling, and Porter line of cases demonstrate one thing: constructive
notice is inappropriate when an unsafe condition is virtually invisible. This case is
distinguishable. This was no invisible gap ala Goebel. It bears no resemblance to the hidden
sink hole in Porter. It is nothing like the camouflaged hole in Kreyling. This case is similar
to Kerr and Rose. As in Kerr and Rose, this case has a municipal defendant (Herriman) and
third parties that undertook to maintain city property.

Kerr and Rose involved unsafe conditions in a makeshift asphalt driveway across a
planter strip and a sidewalk-largely similar to the planter strip in this case. Most importantly,

Kerr and Rose included evidence that an unsafe condition should have been discovered
within a period of time ranging from one and a half to six years. The evidence in this case
suggests that the rusted rebar and six-inch hole existed for up to six years-a sufficient time
for Herriman, Rosecrest, or FCS to remove the rebar and fill the hole.
In conclusion, Defendants had constructive notice of the rusty re bar and six-inch hole.
Plaintiff is only required to produce some evidence of the length of time that the rusty re bar
and six-inch hole existed. 179 It is not necessary to prove the exact length of time to an

1d. at if 3, 1199.

178

Mingolello v. Megaplex Theaters, 2017 UT App 4, ,r 7, 391 P.3d 361, 363
(constructive notice appropriate "when there is some evidence of the length" of time that the
unsafe condition existed).
179

33
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

absolute certainty. 180 As in Rose, there is substantial evidence that the rusty rebar and six-inch
hole were prominent, visible, and that they existed for a very long time.
Ms. Cochegrus was injured on April 29, 2012. 181 The installation of the rebar
occurred six years prior. Ms. Cochegrus, Mr. Cochegrus, Maria del Carmn Tirado Sanchez,
and Adam Jones all saw the rusty re bar. They had no problem identifying it. Their testimony
is corroborated in the numerous photographs of the injury scene. It is clear that the rusty
rebar and six-inch hole were readily apparent, visible, and prominent. The rebar extended out
of the grass several inches. It was exposed to the air for a long enough time to rust. The re bar
had numerous cuts in it, most likely caused by a lawnmower. 182 On the date of the accident,
April 29, 2012, it is likely that the lawn mowing season had only just began and that the rebar
had been struck in previous years. Ms. Cochegrus testified that the lawnmowers "hit" the
rebar and Adam Jones' testimony corroborates her conclusion.
All of these facts taken together-the size and prominence of the rusty rebar, its
oxidation, the date of injury, the older versus fresher cuts, the impact by numerous
lawnmower blades-provide a mountain of evidence that the rusty rebar and six-inch hole
existed for a long enough time that defendants had constructive knowledge of them.
Accordingly, summary judgement should be reversed and the case remanded to the
Third District Court.

1sold.
181

R. 496, 31 :3-7.

182

R. 580, 12:2-4. R. 588, 22: 14-23 :6.
34
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
The Third District Court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed. This case
involves rebar that was involved as part of Herriman 'slighting infrastructure. The rebar was
a permanent condition on the property and was a structure intended to exist for a long time.
Even if not permanant, the rusty rebar and six-inch hole were temporary, unsafe conditions.
Defendants had actual notice and sufficient time to fill the hole and remove the rebar. The
evidence also shows that Defendants had constructive notice and sufficient time to fill the
hole and remove the rebar.
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ADDENDUM

Ut. R. Civ. P. 56
(a) Motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment. A party may move for summary
judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part of each claim or defense-on which
summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the
motion. The motion and memoranda must follow Rule 7 as supplemented below.
(a)(l) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 7, a motion for summary judgment must
contain a statement of material facts claimed not to be genuinely disputed. Each fact must
be separately stated in numbered paragraphs and supported by citing to materials in the
record under paragraph (c)(l) of this rule.
(a)(2) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 7, a memorandum opposing the motion
must include a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is disputed with
an explanation of the grounds for the dispute supported by citing to materials in the record
under paragraph (c)( 1) of this rule. The memorandum may contain a separate statement of
additional materials facts in dispute, which must be separately stated in numbered paragraphs
and similarly supported.
(a)(3) The motion and the memorandum opposing the motion may contain a concise
statement of facts, whether disputed or undisputed, for the limited purpose of providing
background and context for the case, dispute and motion.
(a)( 4) Each material fact set forth in the motion or in the memorandum opposing the motion
under paragraphs (a)(l) and (a)(2) that is not disputed is deemed admitted for the purposes
of the motion.
(b) Time to file a motion. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or
to obtain a declaratory judgment may move for summary judgment at any time after service of a
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party or after 21 days from the commencement of the
action. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought may move for summary judgment at any time. Unless the court orders otherwise,
a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time no later than 28 days after the close of
all discovery.
(c) Procedures.
(c )(I) Supporting factual positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed
or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(c)(l)(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials; or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(c)(l)(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence
of a genuine dispute.
(c )(2) Objection that a fact is not supported by admissible evidence. A party may object that
the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be
admissible in evidence.
(c)(3) Materials not cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may
consider other materials in the record.
(c)(4) Affidavits or declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a
motion must be made on personal knowledge, must set out facts that would be admissible
in evidence, and must show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated.
(d) When facts are unavailable to the nonmoving party. If a nonmoving party shows by affidavit or
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the
court may:
(d)( I) defer considering the motion or deny it without prejudice;
(d)(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or
(d)(3) issue any other appropriate order.
(e) Failing to properly support or address a fact. If a party fails to properly support an assertion of
fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by paragraph (c ), the
court may:
(e)(l) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;
(e)(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;
(e)(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts
considered undisputed-show that the moving party is entitled to it; or
(e)(4) issue any other appropriate order.

(t) Judgment independent of the motion. After giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the
court may:
(t)( I) grant summary judgment for a nonmoving party;
(f)(2) grant the motion on grounds not raised by a party; or
(t)(3) consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material facts
that may not be genuinely in dispute.
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(g) Failing to grant all the requested relief. If the court does not grant all the reliefrequested by the
motion, it may enter an order stating any material fact-including an item of damages or other
relief-that is not genuinely in dispute and treating the fact as established in the case.
(h) Affidavit or declaration submitted in bad faith. If satisfied that an affidavit or declaration under
this rule is submitted in bad faith or solely for delay, the court-after notice and a reasonable time
to respond-may order the submitting party to pay the other party the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, it incurred as a result. The court may also hold an offending party or
attorney in contempt or order other appropriate sanctions.

"•'
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Cory D. Memmott, #8346
Ray Lego & Associates
1100 East 6600 South, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Phone: (801) 269-5634
Fax: (801) 269-5640
E-Mail Address: cmemmott@travelers.com
Attorneys for the Defendant Rosecrest Village Homeowners Association, Inc. and Future
Community Services, Inc. d/b/a FCS Community Management
IN THE 3 rd DISTRICT COURT
OF Salt Lake COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Candice Cochegrus,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE
DEFENDANTS AND DISMISSAL OF
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WITH
PREJUDICE

Herriman City, et al.,
Case Number: 140900711
Defendants.
Tier: 2

Judge Andrew H. Stone
The Court has made corrections to the proposed order submitted, shown below in bold
underline and in strike outs.
DEFENDANT Herriman City ("City"), Rosecrest Village Homeowners Association, Inc.

("Association") and Future Community Services, Inc. d/b/a FCS Community Management
~

("Manager") motions for summary judgment came before this Court on September 21, 2016
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7. Kenneth Parkinson represented the Plaintiff. Cory
D. Memmott appeared on behalf of the Defendants Association and Manager. David Church
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appeared on behalf of City. The Honorable Andrew H. Stone presided. Based upon the pleadings,
motions, the legal argument of the parties, and for good cause:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants City, Association and Manager's Motions For
Summary Judgment are GRANTED. There are no issues of material fact that would preclude
summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Furthermore, the undisputed material facts fail to show
that Defendants clicl Het h:tt-Tte had notice of a temporary condition of unsafe nature prior to the
incident or an adequate opportunity to remedy the condition assuming notice. Proof of such notice
and opportunity is Plaintiffs burden.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that all claims asserted by Plaintiff against
Defendants are dismissed with prejudice, with costs to Defendants.
The order is entered by the Court as evidenced by the dated electronic signature at the top of
this document.
Approved as to Form

Kenneth Parkinson
Attorney for Plaintiff

Approved as to Form

ISi David Church
David Church
Attorney for City
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

(.;i)

I hereby certify that on September 22, 2016, I caused a copy of the foregoing document to be
served upon any person with an electronic filing account who is a party or attorney in this case by
submitting the document for electronic filing pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 5(b )(1)
(A)(i) or by sending a copy of this document via email.
Ray Lego & Associates

ISi Cory D. Memmott
Cory D. Memmott
3
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1

or our obligation.

2

And then last but not least, it was an

3

interesting argument on that same point is that we

4

didn't -- we weren't possessor of that land because we

5

couldn't exclude people from it.

6

those repairs in these infrastructure areas.

7

city has pointed out why Mr. Parkinson had a

8

non-delegable duty towards that area.

9

~

~

We couldn't make
And the

So they can't hide behind well, we

10

delegated it to somebody else.

11

property.

It's the City's

It's the City's duty.

12

And what I have, Your Honor.

Thank you.

13

THE COURT:

14

Well, I think the constructive notice

Thanks.

15

cases are pretty tough.

16

hard burden to put on Plaintiffs sometimes when

17

there's a dangerous condition that may have existed

18

yesterday, it may have existed for years.

19

And I recognize that it's a

But what I'm really asked to do is to

20

allow a jury to infer from lawnmower marks that the

21

condition had existed for a long time, and I just

22

don't think that meets the Gobel standard.

23

first, it's speculative to suggest that because there

24

are lawnmower marks, there would have necessarily been

25

notice, even constructive notice, to the mower.

I think

~

It's
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1

about it speculative, as well to assume that -- just

2

assume and allow a jury to speculate that their

3

lawnmower marks and not something else.
So, based on that, I don't think that

4

5

there's a genuine question to be presented to the jury

6

in tenns of how long the condition existed.
And on that basis, I'll grant both motions

7
8

I ask the Defendants to submit proposed orders.
A VOICE:

9

THE COURT:

10
11

Thanks everybody it' s a

challenging tort case; well-briefed and well-argued.
A VOICE:

12
13

Thank you, Your Honor.

prepare?

You're going to prepare something or -THE COURT:

14

As to orders, would you like to

No.

The Defendants will

15

prepare that proposed order and let the Plaintiff take

16

a look at it.

17

A VOICE:

18

THE COURT:

You want separate or joint?
I think because I briefed it

19

on a single basis, then you two fellows can work that

20

out.
A VOICE:

21

22

We' 11 figure it out together.

Thank you.

23

THE COURT:

All right.

24

(Hearing Adjourned at 3:33 p.m.)

25
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